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Executive Summary 
 The deregulation of the electric utility industry is one of the largest deregulation efforts in 
U.S. history.  Proponents argue that getting rid of the outdated utility model of regulated 
monopolies and introducing competitive markets will lower prices, increase efficiency, and 
result in a net benefit for the nation.  Opponents, on the other hand, believe that both the 
tumultuous history of the electric utility industry and experiments with deregulation have shown 
that competitive markets for electricity are too open to manipulation and will result in increased 
prices for consumers and dangerous volatility in the provision of electricity.  This paper will 
attempt to answer the question: does deregulation lower the price of electricity?  The first section 
of this paper will detail technical and historical background information that is necessary to 
understand the debate surrounding the regulation of electric utilities.  The second section will 
explore the relevant literature surrounding the empirical effects of deregulation.  The third 
section will propose a method of testing the effect that deregulation has on the price of electricity 
by conducting a difference-in-difference analysis between Ohio (deregulated) and Indiana 
(regulated) pre and post deregulation. Results show that deregulation in Ohio has led to a modest 
decrease in retail prices for residential consumers relative to Indiana.  This result was counter to 
the author’s expectations, but is not completely unexpected as it aligns with some of the current 
literature, which generally shows small or no changes to residential retail prices.   
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Background 
Structure of Electric Utilities 
 It is necessary to briefly describe the structure of electric utilities before discussing the 
consequences of regulation and deregulation.  Electric utilities are generally broken down into 
three functions which are generation, transmission, and distribution.  Generation is the physical 
creation of electricity at a power plant.  Transmission is the conveyance of this electricity 
through power lines from the power plants to local utilities.  Finally, distribution occurs when the 
local utilities transmit the electricity to the final consumer (Brennan et al., 2002). 
 Historically, public utilities have been characterized by vertical integration.  This is when 
a single company runs two or more of the functions of a utility.  Vertical integration has two 
main benefits for electric utilities.  First, it allows utilities to take advantage of efficiency gains 
that come from controlling all three functions.  These gains, in theory, will allow companies to 
produce, transmit, and distribute electricity with the lowest possible costs.  Second, because 
electricity storage is quite difficult, electricity transmission requires a lot of coordination 
between generation and distribution to avoid waste.  Vertical integration facilitates this 
coordination by having a single entity working both ends (Michaels, 2004).     
The Era of Regulation 
 Electric utilities have been regulated in the United States for most of their history.  
However, this has not always been the case.  Before the 1930s the electric industry was largely 
unregulated.  The experiences of this era can shed light on the rationale behind regulation and the 
possible consequences of deregulation. 
 The first power plant was built by Thomas Edison in Manhattan in 1882 and by 1902 
there were 3,620 power plants nationwide.  These plants were almost exclusively owned by 
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private companies and were subject to no government oversight (Brennan et al., 1996).  As the 
electric industry grew it came to be dominated by holding companies.  These holding companies 
were characterized by a byzantine structure wherein a small group of investors owned many 
unrelated business ventures and investments.  The electric utilities were particularly attractive as 
subsidiaries of these groups due to the nature of the industry, as electricity generation provided 
guaranteed revenue.  The companies used this revenue in order to finance risky investments, 
which led them to having very large debts and relatively small assets.  Holding companies in this 
era grew into massive organizations and quickly consolidated nearly the entire electric utility 
industry.  In 1930 the 10 largest holding companies produced 75% of the nation’s electricity 
(Mahoney, 2008). 
 When the Great Depression hit the United States holding companies were firmly in 
control of the electricity market.  This led to disaster when banks decided to call in their loans to 
these holding companies.  Due to their highly leveraged nature most of them could not pay back 
their loans and collapsed.  This left the industry in shambles and investors, many of whom were 
average citizens who were told utilities were a safe investment, with nothing (“Public vs. Private 
Power”, 2001).  One of the most infamous cases involved Samuel Insull.  As the head of 
Commonwealth Edison, Insull had pioneered both vertical integration in the electric industry and 
the industries use of holding companies.  Insull presided over one of the largest holding 
companies in the nation which was operating in 30 states at its height (“Public Utility Holding 
Company Act”, 1993).  When the industry collapsed shares in his company dropped from $570 
to $1.25 and 600,000 people lost their life savings.  Insull, once a titan of industry on the level of 
John D. Rockefeller, was vilified by politicians and fled the country in disgrace (Munson, 2005). 
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 The disastrous effects of the unregulated utilities market led to the passage of the first 
strict federal utility regulations in the form of the Public Utilities Holding Companies Act of 
1935 (PUHCA).  This bill sought to address some of the largest drivers of the collapse of the 
early 1930s by strongly regulating holding companies.  The act limited the geographic scope of 
public utilities, limited the amount of debt they could take on, and forbid the grouping of public 
utilities and other subsidiaries under one company (“Public Utility Holding Company Act”, 
1993).  The intent was to prevent the large concentration of power in a few companies and the 
use of utilities to finance risky investments.  Under the act the SEC was given regulatory power 
over any interstate transmission of electricity and individual states were given power to regulate 
the utilities that operated within their borders.  At the same time the Federal Water Power Act 
was amended to create the Federal Power Commission (FPC) which had power over interstate 
transmission of electricity and set the wholesale price of electricity (Brennan et al., 1996). 
 States reacted to their newfound powers of regulation by setting up utility commissions 
and establishing price controls on the retail price of electricity.  These prices were based on the 
cost to produce electricity that producers incurred, with a reasonable bit of profit for the utility.  
The alternative to cost-based pricing is market pricing where the prices are set based on supply 
and demand in a competitive market.  The states also required that producers get approval for 
rate increases and changes to terms and conditions.  Increases had to be justified based on a rise 
in costs to the producer in order to be approved (Fox-Penner, 1994). 
 The next major development in the regulation of the electric industry came in the wake of 
the Northeast Blackout of 1965.   On November 9, 1965 a faulty relay switch caused an 
overloading of the power system and resulted in a blackout that left 30 million people over 
80,000 square miles without power (“Nov. 9, 1965”, 2011).  In response to the blackout, the FPC 
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recommended the formation of a group that can help ensure the reliability of the electric grid in 
order to avoid another incident (“History of NERC”, 2013).  This led to the formation of the 
North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC).  The council divided the United States and 
Canada into coordinating zones.  Each of these zones developed standards and practices for 
coordination and distribution of wholesale energy.  The entire organization shared information, 
experiences and, though voluntary, encouraged uniform adoption of these standards (Brennan et 
al., 2002).  In 2006 NERC gained federal authority to enforce their standards (“Frequently Asked 
Questions”, 2012).  
Towards Deregulation 
 The first movement towards deregulation in the industry began with the energy crisis of 
the 1970s.  The OPEC oil embargo and ensuing energy crisis in the 1970s caused a significant 
rise in the price of oil in the United States.  The price for a barrel of oil rose from $3.18 in 1970 
to $12.64 in 1979 (“Petroleum & Other Liquids”, 2016).  This had two effects that helped fuel 
the movement towards deregulation. 
 The first effect was that the spike in oil prices had a direct effect on the input cost for 
electricity producers.  In the 1950s and 1960s oil prices held steady at fairly low levels.  This 
caused a large investment in oil fired power plants in the United States.  Subsequently, the low 
price of oil meant that consumers enjoyed low, and often declining, prices for electricity.  With 
the rise in oil prices the costs began to be passed on to consumers in the form of higher rates 
(Geddes, 1992).   
 The second effect that the energy crisis had is that it turned energy into a national security 
concern.  Politicians decided that the United States needed to transition away from its heavy 
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reliance on foreign energy sources.  This culminated in the passage of the Power Plant and 
Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (PIFUA).  This act restricted the use of oil burning power plants 
and incentivized the use of coal and nuclear power.  By restricting the use of oil plants the 
government pushed the electricity industry, which was already moving in this direction due to 
increased oil prices, to construct new plants or to convert old plants from oil to coal.  The cost of 
construction of these plants was passed on to consumers (Richardson and Nordhaus, 1995). 
 PIFUA was part of a larger package introduced by President Carter that aimed to reduce 
American reliance on foreign oil.  This package also included the Public Utilities Regulatory 
Policies Act of 1979 (PURPA), which ended up being one of the most consequential pieces of 
legislation in the movement towards deregulation.  PURPA incentivized a shift towards 
alternative energy by requiring producers to purchase energy from certain independent 
generators such as those that produced electricity with alternative energy (Ardoin and Grady, 
2006).  This broke the monopoly that the vertically integrated firms had held for decades.  The 
experience showed that electricity producers could purchase electricity in the first stage, 
generation, from third party producers without causing a significant disruption in the market 
(Brennan et al., 2002).  
 Continued high electricity costs in the 1980s increased calls for action by proponents of 
deregulation.  In the 1990s the FPC, now knows as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), issued a series of orders that allowed deregulation to take place.  These orders required 
vertically integrated firms to allow independent generators access to their transmission lines at a 
reasonable rate.  In the past only certain qualifying facilities were given access to these 
transmission lines, with the FERC orders the floodgates were opened (Borenstein and Bushnell, 
2015).   
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However, it was still up to individual states whether to allow market prices for electricity 
sales within their states.  This allowed states to begin to experiment with deregulation, in some 
cases referred to as restructuring.  Two of the first states to experiment with deregulation were 
California and Pennsylvania.  Both states opened up retail sales to competition.  The created a 
marketplace where consumers could choose between multiple electricity providers.  These 
providers bought or generated electricity then paid for the use of transmission lines to bring 
electricity to consumers.  Regulators in these states phased out price controls on retail electricity 
and slowly began the conversion to market pricing (Blumsack et al., 2005). 
By the year 2000 there were 23 states that had passed bills to ease regulations in their 
electricity market.  Following the energy crisis in California in 2000, which will be covered in 
detail later, the benefits of deregulation were called into question.  By 2014, 16 states had 
deregulated markets, seven states have suspended deregulation, and the rest have never 
experimented with deregulation (“Electricity Deregulation Map”, 2014). 
Proposed Benefits of Deregulation 
 Now that the historical context of deregulation in the United States has been explored, it 
is necessary to describe the theoretical benefits of deregulation that led to this push.  The original 
rationale for the vertically integrated firm was that a monopoly was necessary to capture 
efficiency gains granted by a single firm being able to coordinate all aspects of electricity 
distribution.  Furthermore, the high cost of constructing and maintaining plants required a 
monopolistic firm that could capture guaranteed profits to ensure a return on investment 
(Klitgaard and Reddy, 2000).  Advances in both communication and generation technology, it 
was argued, rendered a large part of these advantages obsolete.   
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 Competition would incentivize firms to engage in cost cutting through the 
implementation of more efficient generation methods.  This would include moving away from 
old, inefficient plants which would have a side effect of lowing environmental damage.  In 
addition to increasing efficiency, firms would be competing for customers which would lead to 
lower prices for all (Joskow, 1997).  By opening up the production and distribution of electricity 
while maintaining the monopoly on transmission, made possible by FERC requiring utilities to 
allow third party transmission, proponents hoped to capture the most beneficial aspects of both 
competition and monopoly. 
Literature Review 
The California Crisis 
 Any examination of the literature surrounding the effects of deregulation must begin with 
the energy crisis in California in 2000.  This was a watershed moment in the deregulation 
movement and spawned countless case studies and papers in an attempt to determine why the 
deregulation experiment in California failed.   
 California created both wholesale and retail sales markets when it deregulated its 
industry.  They allowed wholesale prices to be determined by the market immediately, while 
they put a temporary cap on the price of retail electricity and limited the rate of price increases 
for four years.  This was done in an effort to insulate consumers from price volatility that was 
expected to occur during the transition period.  In addition to the creation of two new markets, 
lawmakers included subsidies for existing utilities to help them cover expenses for already built 
power plants and infrastructure.  The bill was crafted in a manner that gave every stakeholder 
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something they wanted in an effort to attain broad support.  The bill ended up passing unopposed 
(Munson, 2005). 
 California experienced disaster shortly after implementation.  The state dealt with rolling 
blackouts and soaring electricity prices throughout 2000 and 2001.  “Californians’ electricity 
bills went from $7.25 billion for all of 1999 to $7.5 billion for just the first six weeks of 2001” 
(Munson, 2005).  The system experienced extreme volatility; on December 14, 2002 the average 
price for a megawatt hour spiked from $30 to $1400 (Trebing, 2008).  Furthermore, there was 
rampant market manipulation by new entrants to the electricity market.  Wholesale companies, 
Enron being the most famous example, would shut down power plants or book transmission lines 
in an effort to throttle supply during peak load times.  This allowed these companies to then 
charge exorbitant prices to “fix” the problem (Trebing, 2008).  Finally, the caps set on retail 
prices but not on wholesale prices caused large discrepancies in prices which many utilities could 
not afford.  In effect the utilities were paying high prices on the wholesale market and being 
forced to sell electricity at a loss. This caused several large utilities to file for bankruptcy 
(Sexton, 2001).  In 2002, California suspended their deregulation efforts and rolled back reforms 
(Munson, 2005). 
 Many studies have attempted to determine what exactly caused the energy crisis in 
California.  The public policy implications are vastly different depending on if the root cause was 
the method by which California attempted deregulation or if it was deregulation itself.  A fairly 
large amount of literature places the blame at the feet of the method of deregulation.  This school 
of thought argues that political pressure to ensure broad support caused the bill to contain many 
aspects that came to a head and caused disaster.  Chief among these issues was the fact that 
wholesale prices were to be based on market rates while retail prices would be fixed for a period 
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of years.  This was based on the assumption that retail prices would remain higher than 
wholesale prices, as had been the case historically (Sexton, 2001).  When wholesale prices rose 
above the fixed retail prices utilities were forced into bankruptcy and could not facilitate the 
amount of energy the state needed.  In San Diego, where the local utility had been able to buyout 
the retail freeze and thus set their own rates, retail prices tripled (Cudahy, 2002).  Numerous 
studies have come to the conclusion that the structure of Californian deregulation was the issue 
(Bhagwat, 2003; Congressional Budget Office, 2001; Cudahy, 2002; Joskow, 2001; Munson, 
2005; Sexton, 2001).    
 The second school of thought believes that the crisis was caused by flaws inherent to any 
deregulation effort.  The market for electricity is simply unable to efficiently function without 
oversight and regulation.  In the absence of regulation the market is prone to both inefficient 
market domination by large firms and manipulation by firms.  This will drive prices up, increase 
volatility, and lead to sub-standard provision of power (Borenstein et al., 2002; Brennen, 2002; 
Puller, 2007; Trebing, 2008).  Furthermore, electricity markets have a fundamental problem 
wherein “demand is difficult to forecast and is almost completely insensitive to price 
fluctuations, while supply faces binding constraints at peak times, and storage is prohibitively 
costly” (Borenstein, 2002). 
Effects of Deregulation on Retail Prices 
 Regardless of the cause, the failure in California had a chilling effect on deregulation 
efforts nationwide.  However, there is a strong possibility that under the right circumstances, and 
with the proper policy, deregulation can be implemented without causing a disaster.  In fact, 
many states have implemented deregulation programs without a resultant catastrophe.  With that 
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in mind it becomes necessary to look at the broader literature that examines the effect of 
deregulation on the retail price of electricity.  Even if deregulation efforts don’t result in an 
energy crisis they may not be worth the effort if they do not result in lower prices. 
 Quite a few studies have examined the effect of deregulation on retail prices.  Rose 
(2007) found that between 2002 and 2007 regulated states had prices increase by an average of 
19.4%, while deregulated states saw prices increase by an average of 39.7%.  A study that used a 
simple plot of retail prices between 1990 and 2014 in regulation, deregulation, and suspended 
states found that there has been very little effect on prices from deregulation (Morey and Kirsch, 
2016).   
A series of studies using more advanced statistical techniques have found varying results.  
A regression analysis of the early effects of deregulation using state-level panel data found that it 
had resulted in lower prices for industrial and residential consumers (Joskow, 2006). One recent 
study that used a difference-in-difference method, averaging regulated and deregulated states 
found that retail customers enjoyed short-term price benefits but that in the long run deregulation 
has not lowered prices (Su, 2015).  Two studies used regression analysis to analyze the effects of 
deregulation in Texas, finding that prices increased for both residential (Zarnikau and 
Whitworth, 2006) and commercial (Zarnikau et al., 2007) customers.  A final study, which 
estimated the price markup effects on both producers and consumers, found that producers in 
deregulated states had higher profits while consumers in deregulated states had higher prices 
than those in regulated states (Blumsack et al., 2008). 
Research Design 
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 The lack of consensus concerning the effects of deregulation on retail electricity prices 
shows the need for further research in this area.  In order to develop a hypothesis it is necessary 
to apply the lessons from both the history of electric utilities and the empirical studies that have 
already been conducted.  History shows that an unregulated electricity market lends itself to 
market manipulation and poor business practices.  This has been seen time and again throughout 
history.  It was seen pre-1935 during the era of large holding companies and again during the 
California electricity crisis.  The large gap in time between the two events suggests that market 
manipulation is a feature of the system rather than a bug.  This market manipulation has the 
effect of either directly raising electricity costs, as seen in California, or of introducing volatility 
into the system which can cause higher prices or a complete market crash.  Due to the disputes 
over the cause of the crisis in California it will be helpful to examine a state in another part of the 
country that deregulated in a different fashion. 
 Turning to the empirical studies presents a less clear picture.  This is because the price of 
electricity is influenced by such a vast array of factors that it is difficult to pinpoint the effect 
deregulation has had.  Furthermore, many of the states that have introduced deregulation did so 
in response to already having higher than average electricity prices.  This makes it difficult to 
determine a counterfactual level of electricity prices absent deregulation.  However, a close look 
at the more sophisticated studies that have been conducted implies that there is a strong 
likelihood that deregulation has had either a negative impact or no net impact.  Furthermore, 
price volatility and increases will theoretically be most likely during the first few years of 
implementation as consumers and industry adjust to the new scheme.   
 The historical experiences and empirical results lead to two hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 1: deregulation will cause retail electricity prices in a state to increase. 
Hypothesis 2: price increases in Ohio will be most substantial in the first years of 
implementation, followed by less substantial price increases as the program ages. 
In order to test this I use the difference-in-difference (DD) method to study the effect of 
deregulation.  The DD method will allow me to examine the effects by comparing a treatment 
and a control group in time periods before and after deregulation.  This method attempts to 
replicate a randomized experiment in the wild.   DD will help control for any price fluctuations 
that may occur due to differences between the two states other than the policy change and for 
any price fluctuations that occur throughout time for electricity prices in Ohio and Indiana.  I 
believe that this method is superior to a regression analysis in this context due to the large 
number of extraneous factors that may influence the price of electricity.  By selecting treatment 
and control groups that are similar to each other in most respects other than deregulation, the 
level of bias in the results will be lower than it would be using a regression. 
To this end, I will look at Ohio and Indiana before and after Ohio’s deregulation efforts 
took effect in 2001. Ohio passed a bill to introduce electric utility deregulation, SB 3, in 1999.  
Effective January 1, 2001, this law allowed consumers to choose between any of the electric 
providers in their area.  SB 3 was similar to most other deregulation schemes in that it continued 
the regulation of the transmission stage, but opened up generation and distribution to competition 
(Thomas et al., 2014).  Ohio and Indiana are remarkably similar in many respects.  Table 1 
shows a few statistics that illustrate their similarity.  I believe that the nature of their 
demographic and economic similarities means that they are affected by many of the same factors 
and thus make a good comparison group.   
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Table 1 
 
Indiana Ohio 
Population, 2014 6,596,855 11,594,163 
White alone, 
percent, 2013 86.30% 83.20% 
Black or African 
American alone, 
percent, 2013 
9.50% 12.50% 
Bachelor's degree 
or higher, percent 
of persons age 25+, 
2009-2013 
23.20% 25.20% 
Homeownership 
rate, 2009-2013 70.00% 67.50% 
Median household 
income, 2009-2013 $48,248  $48,308  
Persons below 
poverty level, 
percent, 2009-2013 
15.40% 15.80% 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau  
However, with a difference-in-difference, it is necessary to select two states that exhibit 
parallel trends before implementation in order to mitigate potential sources of bias.  If the control 
and treatment groups are exhibiting different behavior pre-treatment it will be difficult to argue 
that any changes post-treatment are due to the treatment.  In this case, the residential price of 
electricity before deregulation was trending in the same direction for both states with rates in 
Ohio being about 20% higher, on average, for the years 1996-2000 (Figure 1). 
Three difference-in-difference estimates will be gathered for different time intervals.  As 
stated above, there may be a period of adjustment during which prices become more volatile and 
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possibly increase.  I predict that after time consumers and the industry will become familiar with 
the new system and prices will decrease, while still remaining high relative to Indiana.  For this 
reason one year, four year, and eight year estimates will be conducted.  The farther out from the 
time of treatment the less reliable the estimation becomes.  This is because as we progress away 
from treatment the possibility of other changes or policies influencing the price of electricity 
increases.  With the possible exception of the eight year estimate, the time horizons chosen for 
this study are relatively short and will still give us telling details about the effects of 
deregulation. 
 
Figure 1 
 
  Source: Energy Information Administration 
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Data concerning the average retail price of residential electricity has been gathered from the 
Energy Information Agency, which compiles state-level, monthly figures for the average 
residential and industrial price of electricity in terms of cents per kilowatt hour (kWh). 
 
 
Results 
Results for the difference-in-difference estimation are presented in Table 2. All estimates 
are reported as cents per kWh.  The results of the estimation show a consistent price decrease 
across the first two time horizons.  The one year estimate is significant to the .05 level while the 
four year estimate is significant to the .01 level.  The results of the eight year estimate are not 
significant so we cannot reject the null hypothesis and thus do not have evidence that Indiana and 
Ohio are statistically different after eight years.  The estimated price decrease in the first year of 
deregulation is .29 cents.  These savings increase to .44 cents four years after implementation.  In 
percentages, the price decrease estimated to be attributed to deregulation was 3.42% in the one 
year estimate, 5.24% in the four year estimate. 
Table 2 – Average Retail Price of Residential Electricity (per kWh) before and after 
deregulation in Ohio 
 
1 year estimate 
 
4 year estimate 
 
8 year estimate 
  
Post 
Treatme
nt 
Pre 
Treatme
nt 
Differenc
e, Post-
Pre   
Post 
Treatme
nt 
Pre 
Treatme
nt 
Differenc
e, Post-
Pre   
Post 
Treatme
nt 
Pre 
Treatme
nt 
Differenc
e, Post-
Pre 
Treatment 
(Ohio) 8.37 8.64 -0.27 
 
8.33 8.64 -0.31 
 
8.85 8.64 0.21 
Control 
(Indiana) 6.92 6.91 0.01 
 
7.04 6.91 0.13 
 
7.63 6.91 0.72 
Difference, 
Ohio - 
Indiana 1.45 1.73 
-0.29** 
 (0.113) 
 
1.29 1.73 
-0.44*** 
(0.105) 
 
1.22 1.73 
-0.51 
(0.463) 
Standard Errors in parenthesis 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 
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Discussion 
 The results differ from expectations across the board.  Each period shows an unexpected 
decrease in prices.  In terms of hypothesis 1, which predicts that prices will increase, it is clear 
that this study does not support this hypothesis.  Prices decreased in every period studied in both 
raw cents and percentages. While perhaps less of a decrease than what proponents estimated, a 
price savings of 3.42%-5.24% in electricity costs would be very valuable to residents, especially 
those in poverty.  This hypothesis was based on two possibilities. First, the assumption that firms 
may engage in collusion, price gouging, and other manipulative practices seen in California.  
This would be due to the high cost of entry into the market which would lead to a small number 
of firms being able to dominate the market.  Second, due to factors such as lack of information, 
apathy, and confusion, consumers may not seek out their optimal electricity provider. The 
evidence suggests that these events did not occur at a significant level.  
 Hypothesis 2 stated that the price increases would be highest in the first year and would 
subsequently decrease as the market adjusted.  At first glance it appears that this hypothesis is 
not supported by the results, as prices decrease in each of the estimated time periods.  However, 
there appears to be support for the broader theory that greater price savings will occur in time 
periods further from implementation (in this case it is simply continued price decreases rather 
than a slowing of price increases).  The four year interval shows an additional .15 cents in 
savings compared to the prices one year after implementation.  
One possible explanation is that as consumers and producers become accustomed to the 
system consumers continue to shop for the best deal they can get while producers continue to 
introduce efficiencies in order to gain more customers through lower prices.  If that were the case 
we would expect to see further decreases throughout the time studied, and this is what occurs.  
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The non-significance of the eight year estimate somewhat clouds the picture as we cannot say 
there is a difference between Indiana and Ohio after eight years.  This suggests either the savings 
experienced in the first years of deregulation evaporate over time or the difference-in-difference 
estimation is a poor estimator over this long time horizon. 
 
Conclusion 
An important limitation to this research is that the reliability of the difference-in-
difference estimate diminishes as the time from treatment increases.  There could have been 
exogenous changes in Ohio that affected the price of electricity in the eight years studied.  This is 
one possible explanation for the lack of statistical significance in the eight year estimate.  
However, if we accept the results that there is no evidence of a statistical difference between 
Indiana and Ohio after eight years there is still evidence to support deregulation.  In this case it 
simply means that deregulation led to a short term price savings. For this reason, it is worth 
comparing these longer estimates to the experiences of other states to determine if the cost 
savings really disappear after a number of years.   
 One related area where long term study is needed is the interaction between the 
percentage of savings consumers experience and the cost of electricity.  If savings do not keep 
pace with electricity prices in the long run, then the short-term effects may be negated.  If this is 
the case deregulation may not be as beneficial as it appears from this study.  Future studies 
should attempt to replicate these results with similar and longer time horizons to determine if the 
trends found in Ohio are consistent with other states.   
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 The central place that electricity has in all of our lives and the proper functioning of the 
economy mean that it is important to study the effects of reforms in the industry.  This is vital to 
producing the best possible outcome for the nation.  While the price of electricity is the focus of 
this paper it is important to remember that it is not the only important outcome.  In the future, 
further research needs to be conducted concerning the effect of deregulation on generating 
capacity, alternative energy sources, and grid reliability, among a host of other variables.  I 
believe that this paper can serve as a template with which to conduct these studies, as the subject 
currently has very few studies that use difference-in-difference estimation.    
In terms of a policy recommendation I think that states with high levels prices relative to 
neighboring areas have reasonable evidence that a deregulation effort could help residents of 
their state.  Ohio shows that, if properly enacted, these policies can introduce modest cost 
savings.  However, legislators should be cautious as California provides an example of 
deregulation gone awry.  It is important that any state contemplating deregulation weighs the 
potential benefits with the potential costs.   
Overall, this study provides some evidence that deregulation can have a positive effect on 
a state.  In Ohio, it appears to have led to a modest decrease in residential retail electricity prices.  
On the whole the literature is still quite mixed, with many studies showing no change or a slight 
change in either direction.  My work is firmly in line with the general consensus of modest to no 
change, but helps support the body of work showing that the modest change will be towards 
price decreases.   
 
 
21 
 
Bibliography 
Ardoin, Phillip J., and Dennis Grady. “The Politics of Electricity Restructuring across the 
American States: Power Failure and Policy Failure.” State &Amp; Local Government Review, 
vol. 38, no. 3, 2006, pp. 165–175. www.jstor.org/stable/4355432. 
 
Bhagwat, Ashutosh. “INSTITUTIONS AND LONG TERM PLANNING: LESSONS FROM 
THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS.” Administrative Law Review, vol. 55, no. 1, 2003, 
pp. 95–125. www.jstor.org/stable/40712136. 
 
Blumsack, Seth et al. “A Cautionary Tale: US Electricity Sector Reform.” Economic and 
Political Weekly, vol. 40, no. 50, 2005, pp. 5279–5290. www.jstor.org/stable/4417520. 
 
Blumsack, Seth et al.. "Electricity prices and costs under regulation and restructuring." 2008 
Industry Studies Conference Paper. 2008. 
 
Borenstein, Severin et al. “Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restructured 
Wholesale Electricity Market.” The American Economic Review, vol. 92, no. 5, 2002, pp. 1376–
1405. www.jstor.org/stable/3083255. 
 
Borenstein, Severin. “The Trouble with Electricity Markets: Understanding California's 
Restructuring Disaster.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 16, no. 1, 2002, pp. 191–
211. www.jstor.org/stable/2696582. 
 
Borenstein, Severin, and James Bushnell. The us electricity industry after 20 years of 
restructuring. No. 21113. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015. 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21113 
 
Brennan, Timothy et al. Alternating Currents: Electricity Markets and Public Policy.  Resources 
for the Future Press, 2002. 
 
Brennan, Timothy et al. Shock to the System.  Resources for the Future Press, 1996.  
 
Cudahy, Richard D. “ELECTRIC DEREGULATION AFTER CALIFORNIA: DOWN BUT 
NOT OUT.” Administrative Law Review, vol. 54, no. 1, 2002, pp. 333–363. 
www.jstor.org/stable/40712225. 
 
“Electricity Deregulation Map.” Electricity Local, 2014. 
http://www.electricitylocal.com/resources/deregulation/ 
 
Fox-Penner, Peter. “Critical Trends in State Utility Regulation.” Natural Resources &Amp; 
Environment, vol. 8, no. 3, 1994, pp. 17–52. www.jstor.org/stable/40923351. 
 
“Frequently Asked Questions.” North American Electric Reliability Council, 2012.  
http://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/Doents/FAQs_DEC12.pdf 
 
22 
 
Geddes, R. Richard. "Historical Perspective on Electric Utility Regulation, A." Regulation, vol. 
15, 1992, pp. 75-82. 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/rcatorbg15&g_sent=1&collection=journal
s&id=361 
 
“History of NERC.”  North American Electric Reliability Council, 2013.  
http://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/Documents/History%20AUG13.pdf 
 
Joskow, Paul L. “CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRICITY CRISIS.” Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, vol. 17, no. 3, 2001, pp. 365–388. www.jstor.org/stable/23606880. 
 
Joskow, Paul L. “Markets for Power in the United States: An Interim Assessment.” The Energy 
Journal, vol. 27, no. 1, 2006, pp. 1–36. www.jstor.org/stable/23296974. 
 
Joskow, Paul L. “Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity 
Sector.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 11, no. 3, 1997, pp. 119–138. 
www.jstor.org/stable/2138188. 
 
Klitgaard, Thomas, and Rekha Reddy. "Lowering electricity prices through 
deregulation." Current Issues in Economics and Finance, vol. 6, no. 14, 2000, pp. 1-6. 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=730107 
 
Mahoney, Paul G. “The Public Utility Pyramids.” The Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 41, no. 1, 
2012, pp. 37–66. www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/662994. 
 
Michaels, Robert J. "Vertical integration: the economics that electricity forgot." The Electricity 
Journal, vol. 17, no. 10, 2004, pp. 11-23. Accessed on LexisNexis. 
 
Morey, M. and Kirsch L. “Retail Choice in Electricity: What Have We Learned in 20 Years?” 
Electric Markets Research Foundation, 2016. https: //www.hks.harvard.edu/m-
rcbg/cepr/Morey%20slides.pdf 
 
Munson, Richard.  From Edison to Enron: The Business of Power and What It Means for the 
Future of Electricity. Praeger, 2005.   
 
“Nov. 9, 1965 | Northeast Is Hit by Blackout.”  The New York Times, 2011.  
http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/09/nov-9-1965-northeast-is-hit-by-blackout/?_r=0 
 
“Petroleum & Other Liquids.” Energy Information Administration, 2016. 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=F000000__3&f=A 
 
Puller, Steven L. “Pricing and Firm Conduct in California's Deregulated Electricity Market.” The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 89, no. 1, 2007, pp. 75–87. 
www.jstor.org/stable/40043075. 
 
23 
 
Richardson, Julia, and Robert Nordhaus. “The National Energy Act of 1978.” Natural Resources 
&Amp; Environment, vol. 10, no. 1, 1995, pp. 62–88. www.jstor.org/stable/40923435. 
 
Rose, Kenneth. "The impact of fuel costs on electric power prices." Consultancy report under 
contract with american public power association, Institute of Public Utilities, Michigan State 
University 43 (2007). 
 
Sexton, Terri A. et al. “CALIFORNIA'S ENERGY CRISIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC 
FINANCE AND TAXATION.” Proceedings. Annual Conference on Taxation and Minutes of 
the Annual Meeting of the National Tax Association, vol. 94, 2001, pp. 27–32. 
www.jstor.org/stable/41954699. 
 
Su, Xuejuan. "Have customers benefited from electricity retail competition?" Journal of 
Regulatory Economics 47.2 (2015): 146-182. 
 
Thomas, Andrew R., et al. “Electricity Markets in Ohio.” Center for Economic Development at 
Cleveland State, July 2014.  
http://cua6.urban.csuohio.edu/publications/center/center_for_economic_development/Electricity
MarketsInOhio   
 
Trebing, Harry M. “A Critical Assessment of Electricity and Natural Gas Deregulation.” Journal 
of Economic Issues, vol. 42, no. 2, 2008, pp. 469–477. www.jstor.org/stable/25511332. 
 
Zarnikau, Jay ,  et al., “Trends in prices to commercial energy consumers in the competitive 
Texas electricity market,” Energy Policy, vol. 37, no. 8, 2007, pp. 4332-4339 
 
 Zarnikau, Jay and Doug Whitworth, “Has Electric Utility Restructuring Led to Lower Electricity 
Prices for Residential Consumers in Texas?,” Energy Policy, vol. 34, no. 15, 2006, pp. 2191-
2200, 
 
